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As an important concept in contemporary ethics, human dignity is often 
appealed to in the context of debates concerning the ethics of human 
enhancement. As Allhoff et al. have pointed out, there is still, and it is likely 
that there will continue to be much debate about what constitutes 
enhancement.1 For the purposes of this article, enhancement implies making 
something better than it was before, and here we are talking about 
technological, genetic, or chemical improvements to normal, healthy human 
beings. Enhancement is therefore distinct from therapy, which would involve 
                                               
1 F. Allhoff, et al. Ethics of Human Enhancement: 25 Questions & Answers. Studies in Ethics, 
Law, and Technology 2010; 4: doi:10.2202/1941-6008.1110. 
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making some ‘abnormality’ more ‘normal’.  Enhancement is about making 
something better than ‘normal’. For example, enhancements range from the 
now commonplace, such as vaccines which permanently alter a person’s 
immune system, to the still theoretical, such as modifications of a person’s 
genetic material to provide superior intellect, moral goodness, or even 
millennial lifespans. Potential enhancements may also be mechanical, such as 
bionic limbs or the implantation of electronic chips to augment brain function.  
Like other areas of bioethical debate, references to the concept of human 
dignity with respect to enhancement often encounter the problem of ‘dignity 
talk’. Through an examination of appeals to dignity in the literature on the 
ethics of human enhancement, this article argues that the problem of ‘dignity 
talk’ arises due to reductionist accounts of human dignity that situate human 
worth in one or other characteristic of being human rather than understanding 
the concept as an affirmation of the worth of each human individual as a 
complex, historical, multidimensional whole. As a possible solution, a 
multidimensional understanding of human dignity is proposed that can function 
in both a descriptive and a normative manner in the human enhancement 
debates.   
DIGNITY TALK 
As is true for many other areas of ethical debate, the debates concerning human 
enhancement have encountered the problem of ‘dignity talk’. Dignity talk is 
where two sides of an ethical debate both appeal to the concept of dignity as a 
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sort of argument-ending trump card. This phenomenon appears to be a 
consequence of the enthronement of human dignity as both the basis and end of 
human rights in the United Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, such that a denial of a particular right is interpreted as a violation of 
dignity. The problem is clear: if both sides appeal to the same concept as the 
key to their argument, the debate ends in a stale-mate, or worse, a shouting 
match.  
The debate on human enhancement can be broadly categorised as a debate 
between two camps: Nick Bostrom (himself a transhumanist) calls them 
Bioconservatives and Transhumanists;2 others, such as Roduit, Baumann, and 
Heilinger talk about bioconservatives and bioliberals.3 The specific terms used 
are not important for the purposes of this article. What is important is that there 
seem to be two camps: those largely opposed to human enhancement, and those 
largely in favour of it. 
With respect to human dignity, those opposing enhancement might claim that 
enhancement violates human dignity. Conversely, those in favour of 
enhancement might claim that human dignity obliges us to pursue enhancement 
or that enhancement at least does not violate human dignity. In other words, for 
the pro-enhancement group, not to use technology to better humanity may 
                                               
2 N. Bostrom. In Defence of Posthuman Dignity. Bioethics 2005; 19: 202-214. 




constitute a violation of human dignity. There are sub-categories within these 
two very broad positions, of course, and, indeed, as with all generalisations, in 
many ways even this broad categorisation may not do justice to the nuance 
present in many of the arguments. Nonetheless, this appears to be how the line 
has been drawn in the literature.  
In light of this dignity talk, some scholars have called for the dismissal of 
human dignity from the discussion.4 I maintain, however, that such a dismissal 
does not solve the problem. Instead, dismissal tends to sidestep the problem, 
temporarily, until the next criterion, be it autonomy, or respect for persons, or 
whatever, encounters a similar semantic ambiguity.5 Moreover, the argument 
will be made below that the notion of human dignity, precisely because it 
affirms the worth of a complex human whole—in a way that ideas like respect 
for autonomy do not—remains a very useful term in the context of debates 
about enhancement.  
To see this, it is necessary to look more closely at how dignity is used in these 
debates. What might the protagonists of the two positions, the bioconservatives 
and the transhumanists, mean when they call upon the notion of human dignity? 
Or, wherein do they see the value or worth of the human individual? 
                                               
4 R. Macklin. Dignity is a useless concept. BMJ 2003; 327: 1419-1420. 
5 S. Visciano. Nanotechnologies, Bioethics and Human Dignity. Journal International de 
Bioéthique 2011; 22: 17-36, 206. 
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WAYS OF TALKING ABOUT DIGNITY 
When one starts to interrogate how the concept of dignity is used in 
enhancement debates, and what the different protagonists use as the basis of 
their understandings of human dignity, one discovers a variety of approaches 
(Table 1).  
First, there are those who maintain that human dignity is inherent and 
inviolable, something human beings always already have. This group can be 
broken up into two sub-groups: species membership and capacities. Second 
there are those who think of human dignity more as something that is mutable, 
and which can be acquired or realised, or indeed lost, during the course of one’s 
life. These too can be broken up into two subgroups: self-worth and behaviour. 
 
Table 1: The Varieties of Human Dignity in the Enhancement Debate 
1. Dignity that Human Beings 
Always Already Have 
2. Dignity that Human Beings 
Acquire 
1a. Species Membership 2a. Self-worth 
1b. Some Capacity or Capacities 2b. Behaviour 




1. Dignity as something human beings always already have 
Broadly speaking, when, as in the first group (1.), human dignity is talked about 
as something all human beings always already inherently have, as a sort of 
ontological inviolable worth, the arguments underpinning these claims can be 
distinguished into two kinds.  
1a Species Membership 
The first kind (1a) argues that all human beings have dignity simply because 
they belong to the human species. Francis Fukuyama grounds dignity in such an 
ontological way in the human species to argue against unbridled 
biotechnological progress. Fukuyama argues that though human beings evolved 
from animals, there was an ‘ontological leap’ in our evolution that gave rise to a 
unique set of characteristics, or what he calls a ‘Factor X’ that distinguishes us 
from animals and provides us with a nature that is uniquely human, and hence 
worth respecting. Fukuyama’s position remains distinctly ontological and it fits 
squarely into the species-membership category: ‘Every member of the human 
species possesses a genetic endowment that allows him or her to become a 
whole human being, an endowment that distinguishes a human in essence from 
other types of creatures.’6  
                                               
6 F. Fukuyama. 2002. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. 
New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux: xiii. 
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Whilst species membership conceptions of dignity are typically used to criticise 
enhancement (or at least radical enhancement, e.g., Nicholas Agar),7 a possible 
way of affirming the worth of species membership, whilst still arguing in 
favour of, rather than against, enhancement, is a transhumanist position that 
values the human species so much that enhancement is necessary for the very 
survival of the species in the face of the inevitable advance of technology (the 
Singularity). On this view, transhumanists will take the evolution of the human 
species to the next level.8  
1b Capacities 
The second kind (1b) tries to argue that human beings have dignity because of 
specific capacities supposedly unique to human beings. The most common 
capacity appealed to is human reason or rationality. Others include autonomy, 
conscience, and the capacity to love. What is important in this 1b understanding 
is that it emphasises the possession of the capacity, not its actual development. 
The possession of the capacity alone is sufficient to warrant respect; how well 
developed the capacity is, is not relevant. 
In making a case for why transhuman enhancement would, at the very least, not 
violate human dignity, Ronald Sandler and John Basl state,  
                                               
7 N. Agar. 2010. Humanity's End : Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
8 O. Masson. Turning into Gods: Transhumanist Insight on Tomorrow's Religiosity. Implicit 
Religion 2014; 17: 443-458. 
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If the basis for moral status is psychological capacity, then human 
dignity is a sort of moral status that human beings have in virtue of the 
psychological capacities that most human beings have (or that most 
would develop under ‘normal’ circumstances). 9   
They go on to argue that transhuman modification of the capacities would 
violate dignity only if it diminishes or removes these capacities. On this view, 
putting wires into the brain such that pushing a button repeatedly would result 
in a state of perpetual pleasure and the ignoring of all other activities or 
concerns10 is not an enhancement at all precisely because it violates these 
capacities. Enhancement may of course quite conceivably improve these 
capacities, and the associated potential for human activity, such that if these 
capacities alone are our basis for dignity, then one could argue that 
enhancement supports human dignity and furthers human flourishing. 
Note, however, that it is also possible to argue against enhancement by 
grounding human dignity in a particular capacity or capacities. Enhancement 
might change a capacity so fundamental to our humanity that one could no 
longer speak of the new being as having human dignity. Many who do so refer 
                                               
9 R. Sandler & J. Basl. Transhumanism, human dignity, and moral status. American Journal Of 
Bioethics 2010; 10: 63-66. 
10 N. Bostrom. 2008. Dignity and Enhancement. In Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays 
Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. President's Council on Bioethics, ed. 
Washington, D.C.: President's Council of Bioethics: 173-207. Note, Bostrom also rejects the 
idea that this would constitute an enhancement. 
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to Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World where everyone is blissfully content and 
controlled by the world power, oblivious to their autonomy. Others fear the 
enslavement of humans by post-humans who have more advanced capacities, or 
indeed the engineering of humans with inferior capacities as a sort of slave race.  
Ruud Ter Meulen, however, following Charles Taylor, argues that dignity 
means that one’s identity is recognized by others and that one is recognized as a 
being of equal value by others, regardless of the degree of difference in identity. 
This conception of dignity requires that one be part of a community of shared 
values, which in turn depends on the ‘capacity to express and to share values.’ 
Whilst enhancement does not preclude the continued possession of this capacity 
per se, Ter Meulen suggests that, since technological devices do not possess 
this capacity, ‘any being composed of such devices will be at risk of losing the 
capacity to participate in the commonality of values that is essential for 
recognizing dignity or for being recognized as having dignity.’11 
                                               
11 R. Ter Meulen. Dignity, Posthumanism, and the Community of Values. American Journal of 
Bioethics 2010; 10: 69-70. See also C. Taylor. 1991. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. Eva Feder Kittay (At the Margins of Moral Personhood. Ethics 
2005; 116: 100-131) similarly suggests that a cognitively enhanced superchimp would not be 
able to really flourish because it would not be able to make all the connections, usually 
associated with flourishing, with either human beings or other chimpanzees.  
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2. Dignity as something human beings acquire 
In addition to views that describe human dignity as some immutable worth 
already present in all human beings, there are those that conceive of human 
dignity in a more mutable sense. 
2a Self-Worth 
First among these are those that understand human dignity as (2a) something 
more akin to a sense of pride in oneself or a conscious sense of one’s own 
worth as a human being living a meaningful life, worthy of the respect of 
others. In the enhancement debate, there is a link between this view and the 
capacities-based view, though the emphasis is different. Unlike the capacities 
view, which says that enhancement is good or bad based on the effect that it has 
on particular capacities, this view talks about enhancement as good or bad 
based on the extent to which it facilitates the realisation of a sense of self-
worth, a sense of achieving a meaningful life well lived through the 
development of these capacities. So, whereas both of the former understandings 
of human dignity are concerned with dignity in the third person, 2a is very 
much about dignity in the first person.12 As Martha Nussbaum has argued, there 
is no point in just affirming the dignity of all human individuals if we are not 
                                               
12 S. Pinker. 2008. Session 5: Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the 




also concerned about how those who are capable of experiencing their own 
dignity actually experience it for themselves in a subjective sense.13   
In the context of enhancement, this understanding of dignity has been appealed 
to with regard to life extension technology. Paul Baltes describes how research 
into aging is showing that while the ‘young-old’ are living healthier, happier, 
more autonomous lives than people a few decades ago, the ‘old-old’ are 
showing increased age-related deterioration. According to Baltes, this is a threat 
to human dignity, not simply because of the deterioration in ‘basic human 
characteristics, including abilities for intentionality, independence, identity, and 
social integration’ (which would be more a 1b approach), but because this 
means that they are not able to live in an autonomous way that enables them to 
exercise their human rights. So he supports technologies that would delay the 
onset of these maladies beyond the natural time of death.14  
One could also argue against enhancement on these grounds, as Fabrice 
Jotterand has attempted to do by appealing to the work of Holmes Rolston III. 
                                               
13 M. Nussbaum. 2008. Human Dignity and Political Entitlements. In Human Dignity and 
Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. President's Council 
on Bioethics, ed. Washington, D.C.: President's Council of Bioethics. Note, Nussbaum is not 
saying that we should not affirm dignity in this third-person sense, only that such an affirmation 
has little meaning if we are not also concerned about how people who are capable of 
experiencing this dignity themselves do experience it.  
14 P.B. Baltes. Extending Longevity: Dignity Gain -or Dignity Drain? Max Planck Research 
2003; 3: 15-19. 
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Rolston develops the idea of what he calls human ideational uniqueness. By this 
he means that humans form a unique symbolic sense of self, and an idea of the 
dignity or worth of that unique self.15 Drawing on Rolston, Jotterand argues that 
technology leads to homogenisation and hence technologically enhanced 
humans would not be unique enough to support a sense of their dignity as self-
worth.    
2b Behaviour 
Second, in this category of dignity as something that we acquire, there are those 
who focus not so much on one’s own sense of self-worth, but on the realisation 
of one’s human dignity through one’s moral behaviour (2b). We often speak, 
for example, of dignified behaviour, or living or dying with dignity.  
Possibly the most significant advocate of this view in the enhancement debates 
is Nick Bostrom, who makes a distinction between human dignity or 
Menschenwürde and Dignity as a quality.16  By making the distinction, it seems 
he wants to avoid any accusation that human dignity in the sense of basic 
respect and equality before the law would be undermined by enhancement. 
What he does argue is that a person’s dignity as a quality would be fostered 
through enhancement. Bostrom draws on the work of philosopher Aurel Kolnai 
                                               
15 H. Rolston, III. 2008. Human Uniqueness and Human Dignity. Human Dignity and 
Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. President's Council 
on Bioethics, ed. Washington, D.C.: President's Council of Bioethics: 129-153. 
16 Bostrom. Human Dignity and Bioethics. 
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to explain what he means by dignity as a quality. Dignity in this sense is a 
virtue, a certain way of being and behaving. Quoting Kolnai, dignity comprises: 
First—the qualities of composure, calmness, restraint, reserve, and 
emotions or passions subdued and securely controlled without being 
negated or dissolved … . Secondly—the qualities of distinctness, 
delimitation, and distance; of something that conveys the idea of being 
intangible, invulnerable, inaccessible to destructive or corruptive or 
subversive interference. … Thirdly, in consonance therewith, Dignity 
also tends to connote the features of self-contained serenity, of a certain 
toned-down but yet translucent and perceptible power of self-assertion 
… With its firm stance and solid immovability, the dignified quietly 
defies the world … .17   
And this virtue, this being dignified, commands a response of admiration and 
respect for both beauty and moral goodness. Consider the likes of Mother 
Teresa or Nelson Mandela. It is this admiration of beauty and moral goodness 
that distinguishes it simply from dignity as status. So, by appealing to Kolnai, 
Bostrom is suggesting that enhancement can help humans to be better people, 
more morally good people, more dignified people. Or as Glenn and Dvorsky 
                                               
17 A. Kolnai. Dignity. Philosophy 1976; 51: 251-271: 253-254. Quoted in Bostrom. Human 
Dignity and Bioethics. 
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have put it ‘Dignity is as Dignity does.’18   We acquire dignity, we realise 
dignity, through our moral behaviour. 
Interestingly, Leon Kass, who mostly opposes enhancement, also has a 
conception of dignity related to how we behave. Just as Bostrom distinguishes 
Menschenwürde from dignity as a quality, so Kass distinguishes basic dignity 
from what he calls ‘the full dignity of being human.’ For Kass, it is precisely 
the limitations of our human existence—our mortality, our needs, and so on—
that make it possible for us to realise the fullness of our innate excellences as 
moral beings. He too uses Mother Teresa as an example, suggesting she is 
dignified not because she is better than someone else, but because she 
exemplifies the full realisation of our inherent human possibilities. So-called 
enhancement that would meddle with this such that it is no longer excellent to 
realise the fullness of one’s humanity through moral behaviour would be 
unacceptable. In words similar to Kolnai’s, Kass says that the concept of 
dignity ‘still conveys the presence and active display of what is humanly best.’ 
And that includes, ‘Courage, moderation, generosity, righteousness, and the 
other human virtues’.19 
                                               
18 L.M. Glenn & G. Dvorsky. Dignity and Agential Realism: Human, Posthuman, and 
Nonhuman. American Journal of Bioethics 2010; 10: 57-58. 
19 L.R. Kass. 2008. Defending Human Dignity. In Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays 
Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. President's Council on Bioethics, ed. 
Washington, D.C.: President's Council of Bioethics: 297-331. 
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Being in relationship over time 
Given the four possible conceptualisations of dignity identified so far, it should 
come as no surprise that references to dignity in the enhancement debates 
frequently seem to muddy the water rather than aid ethical reflection on the 
matter—a point already made by critics of the concept of dignity. For example, 
it is interesting to note that both Kass and Bostrom highlight two different kinds 
of dignity in a manner similar to what has been done here, i.e., a distinction 
between a dignity that all human beings (or persons) inherently have and one 
that is more contingent, and yet arrive at different conclusions. That said, this 
article aims to show that the concept is nonetheless valuable to the discussion, 
not by separating out the different conceptions, but by holding them in a 
dynamic tension, since their object, the human individual, is the same. In order 
to do so, it is worth reflecting on a dimension of our human existence that both 
is necessary for all of the aforementioned conceptions of dignity and provides 
us with a way to connect the apparently disparate conceptualisations. That 
dimension is relationship.  
All of the understandings of human dignity depend on the relational aspect of 
being human. Species-membership (1a) implies relationship because one is 
related to all members of the species as well as related in a different way to 
beings and things not of the human species. Capacities (1b) imply relationship 
because they only mean something relative to the world in which they appear. 
For example, autonomy only makes sense in a world of possible choices, the 
capacity to love only makes sense in a world of possible objects of that love, 
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and so on. Self-worth (2a) implies relationship because self-worth is built up 
based on one’s moral interactions with the world and with others. For example, 
self-worth can be diminished when one is shamed or humiliated by others, and 
strengthened when one is treated with kindness and respect. Self-worth grows 
when one believes one is doing something that is morally right, and diminishes 
when one feels guilt about doing something morally wrong. And the 
behavioural dimension (2b) implies relationship because, to have any meaning, 
it requires others to recognise who you are and what you do as having dignity 
and being worthy of respect. 
Moreover, this being-in-relationship also contains a relationship to time and 
history. As a member of the species, one is in relation to the history and future 
of humankind. One is also in relationship to one’s self over time. Whilst one 
has capacities, their presence and function changes over time. For example, 
one’s autonomy is almost non-existent in one’s infancy, develops to a peak in 
adulthood, and then, for many, deteriorates as one reaches extreme old-age.  
The notion of being-in-relationship-over-time is also helpful in the 
consideration of dignity because it enables us to explain how dignity can be 
both something we already always have, and something we can acquire or lose. 
Types 1a and 1b stand outside of time. They are metaphysical claims. Types 2a 
and 2b, by contrast, are embedded in time, and consequently are also 
contingent. So, we move from the idea that all human individuals always 
already have dignity, because they possess a particular capacity or set of 
capacities, to the idea of dignity as something we acquire or lose through the 
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application of these capacities in the context of our relationships to other 
members of our species and the rest of reality. It is because of our capacities 
that we are able to develop a sense of self-worth and engage in moral 
behaviour. One’s sense of self-worth can be vulnerable to changes in time and 
relationships. One will feel better about one’s self when one believes that one 
has done the morally right thing. One will feel guilt, i.e., feel worse about one’s 
self, when one believes that one has done the morally wrong thing. Finally, it is 
in and through one’s behaviour in relationships over time that one acquires 
dignity as a quality as judged by others in one’s society. When we say that 
someone like Nelson Mandela had dignity, it is frequently in the latter sense, 
and only makes sense in light of his actions over the course of a lifetime. 
This idea of being-in-relationship-over-time is highlighted here because it is 
very helpful in making sense of the problem of dignity talk and in finding a 
possible solution that does not require the dismissal of the concept of dignity. 
Instead, it furthers the usefulness of the concept of dignity for our ethical 
reflection and discussion on the question of human enhancement.  
THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF THE HUMAN 
INDIVIDUAL  
Reductionism as the cause of dignity talk  
Returning to the problem of dignity talk, you will recall that this is when two 
sides of an argument both appeal to dignity as the ultimate criterion 
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underpinning their case, ending in an impasse. With regard to enhancement, 
this means that those in favour of and those against enhancement both appeal to 
dignity, claiming that their approach supports or at least does not violate 
dignity, while the alternative violates dignity.  
The above analysis of the use of human dignity in these debates, however, has 
revealed that often the problem is not the appeal to dignity per se. Rather, the 
problem is that the underlying assumptions that the different protagonists have 
with regard to the ground of dignity is different. In other words, what appears to 
be happening is that frequently protagonists seem to be using dignity not to 
refer to the worth of the human individual per se, but rather to a particular 
feature that they deem to be the basis or ground of human moral worth. If this is 
all that the concept of dignity is good for, then Ruth Macklin would be right to 
call for its dismissal,20 or at least for a clarification of the language such that 
one talks about the dignity of species-membership or the dignity of autonomy, 
and so on.  
However, this leaves an important question unanswered, one which is critical to 
the enhancement debates: is such a reduction of the human individual to a 
specific feature—a feature deemed to be supremely valuable, i.e., as the sole 
basis of dignity—a sustainable position? The answer must surely be no, since 
each of these features on its own also has serious limitations if it is to be used as 
the sole moral criterion. To illustrate the point, consider the following examples 




of what would happen if we took dignity to refer to only one of the four 
features identified in Table 1.  
If human dignity only refers to species-membership, then in terms of the ethics 
of enhancement, only interventions that would be deemed to alter our 
membership of the species would violate human dignity—certain genetic 
interventions, perhaps. But this would leave open an enormous array of other 
possible enhancements, ranging from extreme plastic surgery, to the use of 
steroids in sport, to injecting one’s children with human growth hormone to 
increase their height,21 and many more.  
If human dignity only refers to the possession of some capacity or set of 
capacities, then this would probably prevent enhancements that radically 
diminish those capacities, for example, that would make us less autonomous. 
So something that enhances our moods, but that removes our free will would 
not be considered acceptable. However, again, a wide range of other 
possibilities are left open, including those that may ‘alter the species’, such as 
trans- or post-human interventions, as long as they preserve or enhance that 
‘essential’ capacity. In this case, for example, there would be nothing in the 
concept of human dignity that would help to consider the ethical implications of 
human-machine hybrids.  
                                               
21 T.H. Murray. 2009. Enhancement. In The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. B. Steinbock, ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 492-516. 
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If human dignity is only understood as self-worth, then there may be very few 
enhancements that would be considered taboo. What Thomas H. Murray calls 
the ‘liberty’ argument22 in favour of enhancement largely falls into this 
conception. One can do anything one likes to improve one’s self-worth, perhaps 
with the limit that one only does so in ways that do not undermine other 
people’s self-worth. The problem here is that then we have no way to critically 
examine ‘enhancements’ that may indeed have a significant impact on others, 
for example, using technology to create ‘designer babies’.   
Finally, if human dignity is only understood as a quality appraised by others, 
then this is open to the vagaries of social norms, such that what some might 
consider good or beautiful is considered normative. Stoicism in the face of 
adversity may be considered dignified, but there is a real question as to whether 
being as stoic with the help of drugs, or surgically altering one’s brain, is quite 
so admirable. Moreover, this could also lead to a moral distinction in which 
being ‘enhanced’ is itself seen as morally good. The consequence would be that 
those who choose not to, or cannot be ‘enhanced’ may be treated as morally 
inferior and subjected to all the prejudices associated with such distinctions. 
Multidimensionality as a solution to dignity talk in the enhancement 
debates 
What is important, then, is to avoid a simplistic reduction of human dignity 
effectively to an affirmation of the supreme worth of one or other feature of the 




human individual. Instead, as the above reflection on the idea of  being-in-
relationship-over-time has revealed, we need to remain ever aware of the fact 
that human dignity refers to the worth of the human individual as a whole, as a 
Gestalt. That whole is somehow more than the sum of its individual parts. And 
it is this whole who has worth, who has dignity.23 Thus, a concern for human 
dignity should be more than just respect for autonomy or respect for persons 
(cf. Macklin)—though such a concern can quite legitimately contain these 
aspects in addition to others. A human individual cannot be reduced to being 
just a member of a species or just autonomous, or just someone who thinks well 
or badly of him or herself, or just a series of moral behaviours in a society. 
Instead, a human individual is a complex interaction of all of these things in 
relationship over time. A human individual is an embodied (Species 
membership), meaning-seeking and meaning-making (Self-worth) subject 
(Capacities), in relation to all that is (Behaviour). That is to say in relationship 
                                               
23 Such a multidimensional conception of dignity is also helpful in addressing the question of 
why we might consider people with severe cognitive disability, i.e., people who are not and will 
never be autonomous in the traditional sense, as nonetheless possessing an equal dignity in the 
sense of an equal moral worth commanding our respect. They too are historical beings in 
relationship, and it is precisely this being in relationship that grounds the claim that they too 
possess dignity. They belong to our species, are capable of receiving our care, can be 
humiliated, and can act in ways that bring joy to others. As Eva Kittay has argued, we are all 
some mother’s child. See E. Kittay. 2005. Equality, Dignity and Disability. In Perspectives on 
Equality: The Second Seamus Heaney Lectures. M. A. Waldron and F. Lyons, ed. Dublin: 
Liffey: 95–122.  
22 
 
to the world, to other embodied subjects, to institutions, to time and history, and 
to transcendence.24 
So, if we accept that dignity is synonymous with the affirmation of moral 
worth, and that to affirm human dignity is to affirm the moral worth of the 
human individual as a multidimensional whole, what are the implications of 
this for the enhancement debates? Or put differently, what does the concept of 
human dignity offer to our reflection on the morality of human enhancement 
that other concepts do not? I propose two implications: (1) the concept of 
human dignity can serve a descriptive function in the enhancement debates, and 
(2) it can also serve a normative function in the debates.  
The Descriptive Function of Human Dignity 
A simple definition might say that ethics is about finding ways to recognise, 
evaluate, and act on value or the good. Yet, both in theory and in practice, 
ethics is frequently about navigating one’s way through a world of competing 
goods, or of goods with inevitable downsides, rather than making easy 
decisions between obvious goods and obvious evils. This means that simple 
solutions and one-size-fits-all answers are not always available in practice. This 
is true for the issue of human enhancement as much as it is for many other 
issues of bioethical concern.  
For every example of ‘enhancement’ that most people might intuitively 
consider to be a violation of dignity, like the wire-headed man mentioned 
                                               
24 L. Janssens. Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations. Louvain Studies 1980; 8: 3-29. 
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above, there are others that most people would see as enhancing or at least 
respecting dignity.  For example, the use of vaccines, which, given the fact that 
they permanently improve our natural immune function through altering our 
biological make-up, could arguably be called an enhancement that respects 
dignity in that it furthers human flourishing.25  
Navigating one’s way through this complexity is the work of ethics. Now, 
while it is frequently tempting to try to find one-size-fits-all solutions to this 
complexity, these often lead to a reduction of ethics to a legalistic 
proceduralism. This can be bad for a number of reasons, not least because it can 
lead to the related problems of moralism (we’re good and they’re evil) and 
relativism (we’re all correct in our particular contexts). In order to avoid such 
pitfalls, an approach that takes this moral complexity seriously for human 
beings as meaning-seekers and meaning-makers would seem necessary. Such 
an approach must take seriously not only the many goods and values at stake, 
but also the multidimensionality of the human person as irreducible to one or 
other characteristic. In this sense, then, ethics is about making moral decisions 
and undertaking moral behaviours that have existential meaning for one’s own 
life and the lives of others.  
Human dignity, insofar as it refers to the worth of the human individual as a 
multidimensional whole, can serve a descriptive ethical function to help us to 
focus the questions of value at stake in relation to a given ‘enhancement’, and 
                                               
25 J. Sachs. Weapons of mass salvation. Economist 2002; 365: 101-102. 
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to understand why others may think differently about the same technology. In 
other words, starting from the basic premise that most protagonists would wish 
to affirm the moral worth of human individuals (see the normative function 
below), we can then enter into a meaningful discussion of which particular 
aspects are relevant to a particular enhancement, our respective understandings 
of the aspects, and why they are important. At the same time—and this is why it 
is better not to dismiss dignity—dignity resists any tendency for us to reduce 
the sum of value to any one feature, which means that credence must also be 
given to other aspects of being human in reflecting on what values are at stake, 
and the complex interaction of those values.  
This will also help to overcome some of the apparent polarity that is evident in 
the literature. When we use human dignity in this way we see that many of the 
protagonists, for example, Kass and Bostrom, actually share similar concerns, 
even though they arrive at different conclusions about the best course of action. 
They are both concerned about the basic moral worth of all human beings, they 
are both concerned about respect for autonomy, they are both concerned about 
how we can best live a morally meaningful and fulfilling life and they are both 
concerned about the implications of enhancement for society and its evaluation 
of human moral behaviour.26 The fact that they have different understandings of 
some of these values, and place different emphases on particular aspects, is 
                                               
26 Interestingly, the fact that both Bostrom and Kass affirm a basic dignity or Menschenwürde 
means that, even within the enhancement debates, there is room on both sides for an argument 
in favour of the equal moral status of those who are severely cognitively impaired.  
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revealed by our asking in the first place, ‘what do they mean by human 
dignity?’ Or in other words, ‘what do they deem most valuable about being 
human?’ 
Moreover, by uncovering their similar concerns—in addition to possible 
different emphases of aspects—we may find that the deciding feature has 
nothing to do with the worth of the human. For example, a better explanation 
may be found in the contrast between more optimistic versus more pessimistic 
views on humanity’s moral capacity, the status quo, the future, progress, 
science, technology, and so on. Thus, the concept of human dignity, in its 
descriptive function, also helps to reveal the other questions of value that are at 
stake in the debates. 
The Normative Function of Human Dignity 
The charge could be made, however, that, even if we accept the descriptive 
function of human dignity for the ethics of enhancement, all this does is lead to 
a kind of ethical relativism, such that almost anything can be justified 
depending on one’s conceptualisation of human dignity. Yet, human dignity, 
properly understood as referring to the human individual as a multidimensional 
reality, can serve a normative function in the enhancement debates. This may 
not be as strong a normative function as some of those who have appealed to 
dignity might like it to serve. For example, it cannot be used to absolutely 
prohibit or prescribe all enhancement. The multidimensionality of the human 
individual and the moral complexity of the values involved alone should make 
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this obvious. Nevertheless, it does serve a normative function, and this function 
is threefold. 
First, it is normative in that it affirms that whichever position one is arguing for 
with respect to a particular enhancement technology, one must be able to show 
that this is good for human individuals as meaning-seeking and meaning-
making embodied subjects in relation to all that is. It cannot be good only for 
one or other feature to the detriment of other features. For example, extending 
my life past its normal biological limit without also ensuring that I remain 
intellectually and morally competent does not seem like much of an 
enhancement.  
Second, it is important to note, here, that human dignity affirms the worth of 
human individuals. This means that it is not adequate to show that a particular 
enhancement would be good for a particular individual (e.g., that human growth 
hormone injections for an individual who is only slightly below average height 
may increase his height and give him advantages in society), but also that it 
would be good for all of humanity—the sum of individuals (injecting all 
children with growth hormone would be futile because it would simply increase 
the average height).27  This aspect of the normative function then also serves to 
focus the debate on questions of justice. The just access to and distribution of 
medical treatments is already a challenging issue such that people in developed 
nations tend to have far easier access to life-saving treatments, as well as to 




preventative medicine, such as vaccinations. Moreover, the research into 
treatments for ‘first-world problems’ tends to attract more funding than 
potentially life-saving research into diseases that typically affect people in 
developing countries. In the case of enhancement technologies, then, if 
enhancement led to a further exacerbation of these disparities, for example by 
substantially increasing the lifespan of those who could afford it to the 
detriment of those who cannot, arguments could be made against it on grounds 
of justice: such enhancement would not be good for all of humanity.28  
Third, human dignity is normative in that it helps us to set certain limits to what 
would be considered reasonable enhancements. So, those enhancements that are 
clearly good for human individuals on the whole in the multidimensional sense 
would be widely endorsed, and those that are not good on the whole, are also 
generally not endorsed, by both bioconservatives and transhumanists. Both 
sides would reject the idea of the wire-headed man as a legitimate enhancement 
to human dignity on the one hand, and both sides would largely support the 
                                               
28 In addition, another consideration of justice would concern those who are severely 
cognitively impaired. Given that there are already those who argue that such human individuals 
do not have a moral status equal to other ‘normal’ human beings, enhancement of human beings 
to create a post-human super-race, might only further exacerbate conditions that make such 
claims seem self-evident. A multidimensional conception of human dignity should at least call 
such claims into question, and possibly serve as the basis of an argument to assure that 




legitimacy of vaccinations on the other. In light of a multi-dimensional 
understanding of human dignity, it is reasonable to do so because the former 
reduces the human person to a particular sensation, and the latter opens up 
greater opportunities for the living of a meaningful life in relation to the world 
and others as a whole.  
Thus, the normative limits that human dignity seems to set for enhancement 
concerns those interventions that would change something so fundamental to 
our being human that it would rightly be considered a violation of human 
dignity. Such ‘enhancements’ would include anything that so radically alters 
our genetic make-up that we are no longer talking about human beings,29 or so 
radically diminishes a capacity essential to our understanding of what makes us 
human, e.g., our autonomy, or which makes it impossible to engage 
meaningfully in moral behaviour so as to develop a sense of self-worth, or 
which would constitute condoning behaviours that we would not normally 
consider to be morally worthy or dignified. As a corollary to this point, 
                                               
29 This article deals with the concept of human dignity. Hence the emphasis too on the necessity 
of being a member of the human species. This is not to deny the meaningfulness of talking 
about the dignity, i.e., moral worth, of other beings. For example, one may wish to ascribe 
dignity to persons, where persons are understood as any being that displays certain rational 
capacities. These debates are not dealt with in the present article. Nonetheless, I do maintain 
that being a member of the human species is important, since it as members of this species, and, 




however, it also means that many of the most hotly debated enhancements will 
be those that concern these limits (e.g., genetic modification). 
Within these limits, however, there is a lot of room to move. This is part of the 
moral complexity of human enhancement technologies. Whilst it may be 
possible to quite clearly identify certain technologies that almost certainly 
would be morally bad and wrong, there would be many where there may be a 
number of morally acceptable options, of which some may be morally better 
than others. In such cases, though human dignity may not be able to serve as a 
definitive criterion, a multidimensional understanding of human dignity may 
still help to point us in the direction of good and better answers. At the same 
time, by highlighting the moral complexity inherent in our being 
multidimensional and especially historically-situated beings, human dignity 
calls us to always be humble in our assertions regarding the moral rightness or 
wrongness of particular enhancements. The Utopias and dystopias of the future 
are both possible, and we can never be absolutely sure to which our moral 
decisions with regard to enhancements will lead us. Yet, our concern for the 
worth of all human individuals compels us onward, with caution and humility, 
even in the face of this uncertainty. 
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